166: FEDERAL REPORTER. �repealed, and the power of taxation limited by subsequent legislation. �To this returnthe relator bas filed a general demurrer, and the only question is as to whether this retum presents any reason wby a peremptory mandamus shall net issue in the case. �It is urged by respondent's attorney that, by analogy to the statute limiting the lien of judgments on real estate to seven years, the right to enforce payment of a judgment from a municipal corporation, by compelling the levy and collec- tion of a tax, cannot be enforced after the lapse of seven years; but I cannot concur in this position. The duty of a municipal corporation, to take the proper steps to raise means wherewith to pay judgments against them, is a con- tinuing obligation which is not afifected by the lien of the judgment on real estate, and is not in the least affected by the statute giving and limiting such lien; and, even if the lien of a judgment on real estate, from the time of its rendi- tion, has lapsed, the right to issue an execution and levy on any property subject to execution remains. See Strihling v. Prettyman, 67 111. 371. �This view of the law is also further supported by the prin- ciple that no execution oan issue against a municipal cor- poration, as was fully decided in the case of Chicago v. Hal- sey, 25 111. 595, and affirmed in Odellv. Schroeder, 58 111. 353, and 84 111. 294. �Showing, as these cases do, that no execution could issue against this municipal corporation, in the first instance, to enforce the collection of this indebtedness, the only remedy ■was to compel the levy and collection of the tax, or an order on the treasurer, if the money was already collected and in the treasury. �As to the alleged repeal or modification of the acts of the legislature of the state in regard to the levying of taxes by municipal corporations, it appears from the records of the court that the bonds on which the judgments were rendered were issued in 1855, and while the act of 1852 was in full ��� �
