COFFET V. UNIVFItSAIi LIFE INS. CO. 805 �Idw touching the proper construction of the clauses in the poiicy, and the strict rights of the parties under the literal letter of the policy, than in the light of the exceptional facts and oircumstances of the case. Looking alone at the policy, it may be said of it, iu substantially the language of the court in N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 30, that the con- tract is not an assurance for a single year, with a privilege of renewal from year to year by paying the annual premium, but that it is an entire con tract of assurance for 15 yea^s, or for life, if the assured should die before the expiration of that period, subject to discontinuance and forfeiture for non-pay- ment of any of the stipulated premiums, except that in case of def ault in any payment after two f ull years' payments had been made, the policy might be exchanged for a paid-up pol- icy for a certain amount, on transmission of the original pol- icy, duly receipted, to the company within sixty days after such default. This was the contract. In the absence of anything to save the case from the operation of the letter of the policy, it was undoubtedly the duty of the assured, if he -wished to keep the policy in continuing force, to pay the premium due August 23, 1877, on that day. If, on the other hand, he wished to secure a paid-up policy, he could make default in the payment of the premium, and then his duty was to trans- mit the original policy, duly receipted, to the company within sixty days after such default. These were conditions prece- dent in the one case to the maintenance of his rights under the original policy, and in the other to his right to a paid-up pol- icy. Failure to perform either, if there were no oircum- stances adequate to excuse non-compliance with these condi- tions, involved a lapse of the policy and loss of all rights thereunder. This conclusion is sustained by the better authorities on the subject. �But cases of the general character of this, sometimes arise, in which the oircumstances are deemed adequate to justify the courts in relieving a party from such consequences, and in which such relief is deemed consonant with proper observ- ance of the rights of parties under their contract. Does this case f all within that category ? �v.7,no.3— 20 ��� �
