BABBETT t). HOPEINB. 315 �«ner ciearly arose in the land forces within the meaning of the constitution. He was a private soldier, on daty -with his command, and he committed an a>ssault upon a fellow sol- dier. Congress had power, therefore, to confer upon a court- martial jurisdiotion over the offence. The jurisdiction is plainly conferred by the Bixty-second article of war, which provides that — �"Ail crimes not capital, and all disorders and neglects which offlcers and soldiera may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline, though not mentioned in the foregoing articles of war, are to be taken cognizance of by a general, or regimental, garrison, or field offl- cers' court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the oSence, and , punished at the discretion of such court." U. B. Rey. St. i 1342. �The proceedings against the prisoner having been instituted "while he was clearly within the jurisdiction of the military authority, by the prefering of the charges, and by his arrest, as well as by the forwarding of the charges to headquarters, with an application for the appointment of a court-martial for his trial, the question for determination is, did that juris- diction oease and expire at the end of the prisoner's term of «nlistment, so that all proceedings after that date were void ? �The general rule is that when the jurisdiction of a court attaches in a particular case by the commencement of pro- ceedings and the arrest of the accused, it will continue for all the purposes of the trial, judgment, and execution. This rule bas long been recognized by the war department as ap- plicable to cases properly instituted before a legally-consti- tuted military court-martial, and in which, before the conclu- sion of proceedings, the term of enlistment of the accused «xpires. Winthrope's Dig. Opin. of Judge Advocate General, 1880, p. 210. The general rula is grounded in sound reason. Many of the greatest military offences are not cognizable by the courts of common law. A soldier might be guilty, on the «ve of the expiration of his term of enlistment, of the gross- est insuit to his officers, or of disobedience of orders, or of desertion in the face of an enemy, and if he could not be held for trial after the end of his term he would escape punish- ment altogether. To hold that in every such case the juris- diction of a court-martial would cease with the expiration of ��� �
