UNITED STATES V. BYBNE. 457 �One point made in regard to the conviction under the first count is that the intent chargea was not proved, beeause there was no evidence that any spirits had ever been completely rec- tified by the defendant, but only evidence of a partial rec- tification by him. But there was evidence that the defendant had in his possession a rectifying apparatus, and that illicit spirits had been conveyed to said apparatus in aie barrels, and, in the presence of the defendant, poured into the re- ceiving tub of such apparatus on two different occasions, and under suspicious circumstances. This evidence was suffi- cient to justify the jury in finding that he was then carrying on the business of a rectifier, with intent to defraud the gov- ernment of the tax on the spirits there and then rectified by him. �One point made in regard to the conviction upon the third count is that the provision of the statute is intended to apply to cases where the spirits received have been removed from a registered distillery, and has no application to a case where the spirits received are the produet of illicit distillation in an unauthorized distillery. But the language of the stat- ute is bro.ad enough to cover the receipt of distilled spirits produced at and removed from an illicit distillery, and no reason has been suggested for giving to the statute a more restricted application than required by the words employed. �Auother point made in regard to the conviction on the third count is that there was evidence at the trial that, on the same day on which the information was filed, the district attorney had been told that the spirits received by the defend- ant were delivered by a man named Malone, whereas the information avers that the spirits were received from some person or persons to the district attorney as yet unknown. This point is an afterthought. No such point was taken at the trial. Some 16 and more requests' to charge wero pre- sented to the court, and in none of them was there an allu- sion to any such defect in the evidence; and it is plain to see that the testimony now relied on to shpw knowledge on the part of the district attorney was elicited at the trial for a totally different purpose. The point not having been mada ��� �
