ANTOLA V. GILL. 489 �the performance of the new contract at once. As coal might be taken for ballast, it is possible that stopping for a reason- able time to put on such a cargo for that purpose might not be "delay" within the meaning of that term as then under- stood by the parties. That probably would be doing no more than was provided for, as ballast might be necessary to enable her to proceed. But permission to take ballast only implies such delay as is necessary to get the ballast p.n board. Its effect in the present charter was to bind the vessel to get her ballast on board if necessary without delay, ana ' then I)ioceed on her voyage to Baltimore. �The question then is whether this was done. We have no hesitation in saying it was not. The vessel was bound to begin the performance of the contract without any delay. Con- fessedly, she did not begin until the expiration of 31 days from the time the charter-party was signed, and this because it took her all that time to get rid of the obligations of another con- tract she was under to deliver a cargo she had on board to consignees in Grenoa. In other words, she was delayed in the performance of her new contract because she was bound by an old one. She was not ready to proceed from Genoa when her charter sued on was effected, and her departure was afterwards unreasonably delayed, so far as the respondents are concemed. By staying at Genoa to discharge her cargo she saved the profits of her old contract, but we think she is not now in a condition to throw the losses of the new one upon her charterers. �It follows that the decree of the district court must be affirmed and the libel is, consequently, dismissed. ��� �
