540 FEDERAL REPORTER. �is appointed by his principal, and he is subject to Lis prin- cipal's control. Tiie principal can dissolve the relation between them, and annul the agent's authority at his will and pleasure. Hence, the principal is liable and the agent is net liable. Hence, the action should be against the prin- cipal, and not the agent. It is needless to say that, in all these respects, there is a radical difference between the char- acter and legal functions of an agent and a receiver appointed by a court of equity. To make a railway company respon- sible for the acts and contracts of an of&cer whom they can neither appoint nor control, direct nor remove, on the ground of agency, would be to violate the fundamental principles of the law of agency. �If no action could be maintained upon the torts or con- tracts of the receiver against the old railway company, a fortiori none could be supported against the new or purchas- ing company. Doubtless, if the daimant had a legal or an established equitable lien against the property, he could enforce it by a proper proceeding at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction ; but we are now consider- ing not legal or established equitable liens, but claims of a Personal nature, founded upon contract or tort, which are yet to be established by some form of legal proceeding. �I repeat, that if the receiver had been discharged and tha property turned over to the new company unconditionally, and without reservation, I am at a loss to see what legal remedy claimants, without established liens, would have. But the court did not in this case so turn over the property. It would have been a most unwise and unjust proceeding to have done so, leaving just claims and liabilities incurred by a receiver of its own appointment, without any provision whatever to enforce them. On the contrary, this court, in the final decree of May 20, 1879, retained here the case of the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company against the Central Eailroad Company of lowa and others, and in express terms reserved its juris- diction of said cause to enforce the payment of debts and liabilities incurred by its receivers. For this purpose, at least, that suit bas never been dismissed. It is still pending, and ��� �
