600 FEDERAL REFOBTEB. �and pay all expenses. The libellants were each of them hired bythe master of the boat on montbly wages, and, it may be fairly inferred, were aware of the arrangement between the master and owners under which the boat was employed. These facts are net sufficient, however, to deprive the libellants of a lien. The Sloop Canton, 1 Sprague, 440 ; The Galloway C. Morris, 2 Abb, 168 : Flaherty v. Doane, 2 Low. 150. �It was necessary for the claimant to go further, and show that the libellants agreed to waive a lien upon the vessel and rely upon a personal credit alone. In regard to the libellant Biggs, I find no testimony other than what is above stated. In regard to the libellant Billard, the master testifies that when he was hired Billard was told he was to look to the captain and crew for his pay. The libellant denies this, — not in BO many words, it is true, for he was examined by deposi- tion before the master was examined, and was not recalled ; but, in substance, his testimony is to the contrary of that of the master in regard to being told that he was to look to the captain and crew for his pay. It also appears that when Billard was discharged he asserted his right to a lien on the vessel, and, aocording to his testimony, the master then con- ceded that he had such a right. But the master denies this, and says that the existence of such a right was denied. �In this state of the evidence I am unable to say that an agreement to rely upon personal credit bas been proved. The presumption of the law must, therefore, control, and the libel- lant Billard, as well as the libellant Biggs, be awarded a decree for the wages due them respeotively. Only one bill of costs will be allowed, unless good reason be shown for bring- ing two fluits. ��� �
