650 FEDERAL REPORTER. �credibility of which was peculiarly for the consideration of the jury. AsBuming, however, that the evidence did not jus- tify the correctness of the plaintifs valuation of the prop- erty, there was sufficient to ai;ithorize the jury to find that the plaintiff did not intentionally overestimate the value of the property, and that, although his valuation may have been extravagant, it was not intended to be unfair. The ques- tion of fact was a very plain one, and the jury could not have failed to appreciate the force and bearing of the testimony. Their conclusion is not so palpably adverse to the weight of the evidence as to suggest partiality or prejudice. The case is not one where, aocording to the settled rules of judicial discretion, the verdict should be disturbed. �It is insisted that the plaintiff cannot escape the effect of an overvaluation upon the theory that it was an unintentional one. While the policy provided that an overvaluation would render the policy void, the representation of value was in a written application, by the terms of which the assured only assumed to state the facts in regard "to the condition, situa- tion, and value of the property to be insured, so far as the same are known to the applicant." The plaintiff, therefore, only assumed to give the defendant the benefit of his own knowledge ; and, although he may have been mistaken, there was no breach of the representation unies» the overvaluation was knowingly made. Good faith was all that was required on the part of the assured. The case of Franklin Fire Ins. Co. V. Vaughan, 92 U. S. 516, is the only authority which it is necessary to cite as conclusive upon this point. In the case of the National Bank v. Ins. Co. 95 U. S. 673, the pol- icy, as in the present case, made the application a part of the contract, and provided that an erroneous representation should render the policy void ; but it was held, inasmuoh as the representation only assumed to make a true exposition of the facts, so far as known to the applicant, that there was DO breach unless the estimates of the insured were inten- tionally excessive. �It is also insisted for the defendant that the court erred upon the trial in exeluding evidence oSered for the purpose of showing that the insured had a defective title to the real ��� �
