Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/158

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14
The Fœderalist.

men to offices under the national Government, — especially, as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will result, that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national Government, will be more wise, systematical, and judicious, than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more safe with respect to us.

Because, under the national Government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and executed in the same manner, — whereas, adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent Governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the Convention, in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to, one national Government, cannot be too much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consequently having little or no influence on the national Government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because, even if the governing party in a State should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may, and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State, and may affect a great