we take into our view the aid to be derived from the militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion, (as has been fully shown in another place,) the contrary of this supposition would become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
[From the New York Packet, Tuesday, December 25, 1787.]
To the People of the State of New York:
IT has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind proposed by the Convention, cannot operate without the aid of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a presupposition, that the People will be disinclined to the exercise of Fœderal authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the inaccuracy, or inexplicitness, of the distinction between internal and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination in the People. Unless we presume, at the same time, that the powers of the general Government will be worse administered than those of the State Government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the People. I believe it may be laid down