I pass over the Constitutions of Rhode Island and Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution, and even before the principle under examination had become an object of political attention.
The Constitution of New York contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of improperly blending the different departments. It gives, nevertheless, to the Executive magistrate, a partial control over the Legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like control to the Judiciary department; and even blends the Executive and Judiciary departments in the exercise of this control. In its Council of Appointment, members of the Legislative are associated with the Executive authority, in the appointment of officers, both Executive and Judiciary. And its Court for the trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, is to consist of one branch of the Legislature and the principal members of the Judiciary department.
The Constitution of New Jersey has blended the different powers of Government more than any of the preceding. The Governor, who is the Executive magistrate, is appointed by the Legislature; is Chancellor and Ordinary, or Surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and President, with a casting vote, of one of the Legislative branches. The same Legislative branch acts again as Executive Council of the Governor, and with him constitutes the Court of Appeals. The members of the Judiciary department are appointed by the Legislative department and removable by one branch of it, on the impeachment of the other.
According to the Constitution of Pennsylvania, the President, who is the head of the Executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which the Legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an