Page:Federalist, Dawson edition, 1863.djvu/573

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The Fœderalist.
429

which, requiring greater extent of information and stability of character, requires, at the same time, that the Senator should have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the National Councils.

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of Senators by the State Legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the Government, that which has been proposed by the Convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State Governments such an agency in the formation of the Fœderal Government, as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems.

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a People thoroughly incorporated into one Nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the Government; and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils; it does not appear to be without some reason,