is made, there is the practical following out of the course fixed upon. Such are the three elements usually noted in the process. But, allowing the dust occasioned by this language to subside, let us see whether nothing has escaped us in the confusion. We observe, then, that the power of choice said to be given is, at first, undetermined; that, indeed, it is on this openness or want of determination that the essence of the liberty here described is placed. But while this indetermination continues, the power of choice of course remains inoperative. Before any of the courses laid down can be followed, this power must be determined to the particular course fixed on; that is to say, an act of determination (the choice itself) must intervene between the undetermined power of choice, and the course chosen. Here, then, we have a new element an element seldom specifically or rigidly noted in the usual analysis of the process. The statement now stands thus: 1st, The given being; 2d, The undetermined power to choose, the power as yet open to several courses of conduct; 3d, The act of determinate choice, the power now adstricted to one course; 4th, The actual performance itself. Now the third element of this statement, the one usually passed over without notice, is the only step which we would raise any question about. We ask, What adstricted the power to the course selected? Whence comes this act of determination? Is it, too, given, or is it not? If it is, then what becomes of human freedom? The act
