absolutely by the creature who apparently exerts it, every particle of it falls to be refunded back out of this creature into the source from whence it really comes; and this clearly leaves the being in question a mere passive creature throughout, and, at any rate, incapable of putting forth a primary and underived act.
But though it is impossible for us to conceive an underived act put forth out of man's natural existence, there is yet nothing to prevent us from conceiving an act of this kind put forth against man's natural or given existence. If we consider it well, we shall be satisfied that it is only on this ground that the conception of an underived act is possible; and, moreover, we shall see that, on this ground, the conception of such an act is inevitable.
For if we suppose an act of antagonism to take place against the whole of man's given existence, against all that man is born, it is impossible that this act itself can be given or derivative; for the supposition is, that this act is opposed to all the given or derivative in man, and is nothing, except in so far as it is thus opposed. If, therefore, it were itself derivative, being no longer the opposite of the derivative, it would be a nonentity; or it would be a suicidal act exterminating itself. Therefore, if we are to form a conception at all of such an antagonist act, we must conceive it as absolutely primary and underived; and, on the other hand, if we would frame a true conception of human liberty, or an
