My instinct is it wouldn't really help us that much. They never stick with us.
Kissinger: My instinct is we should make low-key support. We would get some little black African state support. But you would keep the liberals for about 48 hours.
The President: If we could get a quid pro quo. Okay, but the caucus doesn't work that way.
Scowcroft: The Whip can't even keep them.
The President: Then if we weigh in, that would do it.
Kissinger: That is why they want us to get in.
The President: If they can show it is industrially to our benefit, okay.
Kissinger: We would get a couple of headlines and that is okay. But in the long run we are better off if we can't be pushed.
The President: Okay, I will stay out of it and you call Rhodes.
Kissinger: On the Soviets -- we are brutal when they step over the line. They will test you and we should keep this in mind. LBJ dosed out power; I believe if we use American power it should be massive.
In 1970 they started building a submarine base in Cienfuegos. State wanted to wait until the base was finished. Nixon told me to make a strong statement and put a destroyer off the base.
Our experience is hit them early and hard when they threaten.
Their power structure is cumbersome. You have much more flexibility.
Scoop doesn't understand -- he thinks you can keep squeezing them.
Cyprus is another humiliation -- it is being settled without their participation. We send them letters so they can't say we are freezing them out. Their frustration has to rise. That is where the trouble comes in. Dole it out so
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