Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 32.djvu/366

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330
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
330

330 HARVARD LAW REVIEW an administration suit, is fully protected.®^ The creditor, thus de- prived of his right against the representative, still had a remedy against the legatees or distributees. In Fletcher v. Stevenson^^ the retention for possible future liability was put with good reason on the ground of a protection to the convenantee. But in a later case such retention was conceived to be for the benefit of the executor or administrator; and, as soon as it was held the decree of court pro- tected him, the reason for the retention of assets seemed to dis- appear.^^ Accordingly it is the modern practice not to retain ex- cept in cases of leases where there is a privity between the executor and the lessor.®^ Closely connected with the foregoing inquiry is the situation of an executor or administrator who pays legacies or distributive shares in ignorance of a present existing liability or of an obligation which may later mature. The law of England seems now clear that, unless the representative pays the beneficiaries under order of the court in an administration suit, he is liable to the creditor.^ But if he secure the sanction of the court the creditor is without other remedy than to follow the assets in the hands of the legatees or distributees. This protection to the representative was a great inducement to him to resort to the Court of Chancery for an ad- ministration suit.^^ His position is further mitigated by Lord St. Leonard's Act,^^ allowing him after such notice as the Chancellor shall deem proper and the expiration of the time stated therein, to distribute the assets free from fiurther molestation by indolent or belated creditors. In the United States the question of presentation of claims is governed by statutes in general requiring the representative to give notice of his appointment and barring creditors who do not present their claims within a short period of limitation. The neces- sity of presenting contingent claims varies. The Massachusetts »2 March v. Russell, 3 Myl. & Cr. 31 (1837); Knatchbull v. Feamhead, 3 Myl. & Cr. 122 (1837); Waller v. Barrett, 24 Beav. 413 (1857). « 3 Hare, 360 (1844).

    • King V. Malcott, 9 Hare, 692 (1852); Dodson v. Sammell, i Dr. & Sm. 575 (1861).

" In re Nixon, [1904] i Ch. 638; In re King, [1907] i Ch. 72. »« Norman v. Baldry, 6 Sim. 621 (1834); March v. Russell, 3 Myl. & Cr. 31 (1837); Knatchbull v. Feamhead, 3 Myl. & Cr. 122 (1837); Waller v. Barrett, 24 Beav. 413, 418 (1857). •^ Maitland, Equity, 197. w Stat. 22 & 23 Vict., c. 35, § 29.