Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/101

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THE SPANISH ARMADA
81

better gunners, and (an important point) ports that admitted of far better training of the guns. The English were also altogether better seamen, and their ships infinitely more handy, so that, despite the numerical inferiority of the English, the Spaniards never had that certain naval superiority which was a cardinal feature both of Santa Cruz's first plan and of the modified plan finally adopted. The Spaniards, indeed, had nothing in their favour except bulk and the prestige of Spain. There is no reason to believe that this prestige had the slightest effect upon the 18,000 men odd who manned the English fleet, whatever opinions may have obtained on shore. Drake and his fellows were well used to conflicts with the Spaniards.

The Spanish fleet, though it carried a very inadequate supply of ammunition and stores, was not altogether so ill prepared as its fate might suggest. Medina Sidonia's instructions specially referred to the English superiority in guns and gunnery and directed him to engage at close quarters.[1] In this way the high poops and forecastles could be used to deliver a deadly small-arm fire upon the English decks, and upon this the Spaniards seem to have relied, as in the first action on Sunday, June 21, all their efforts were directed to a vain attempt to close.

  1. Duro. ... It is of interest to note here that Rogestvensky appears to have received ' special instructions ' with a view to neutralising Japan's salient known superiorities. ' Keep everything together ' seems to have been the one great maxim (perhaps the only one) of the Baltic Armada.