Page:Heresies of Sea Power (1906).djvu/166

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
142
HERESIES OF SEA POWER

modern war costs a very great deal. To Japan it meant that Vladivostok remained Russian.

A remarkable illustration of the importance of bases has been afforded by Russia herself. When the crew of the Kniaz Potemkin Tavritchesky mutinied (1905) and declared 'war,' what possibilities might have seemed to be theirs. They had nothing to fear from the remaining Russian battleships, coal was to be had for the seizing of Russian colliers, food for the demanding. And the ship did—nothing. Lack of agreement amongst the mutineers, some for the bold course, some for the safer, might account for this in part, but by no means wholly. They had, however, no base, and so drifted to a neutral harbour and inglorious surrender. This the Russian Admiralty, which had had ample opportunity to realise the importance of the base question probably recognised: hence the casual official acceptance of the situation when the mutiny began.

It may be urged that had the Japanese invested Vladivostok and so prevented Rogestvensky from coming East, the Baltic Fleet would have been left to damage Japanese commerce in the Indian Ocean or around the Straits of Malacca. Its lack of a base, however, would have prevented this, even supposing appreciable commerce to have been open to attack. Rogestvensky could have done nothing except morally; and moral menaces do not long bring forth fruit. The failure to destroy or neutralise Vladivostok was, there-