r .-, .^°"f rlh% ^1 ADELAIDE AND VICINITY xl Constitution of South Australia In fact, the Act was never intended to be, and is not, even the skeleton of a complete Constitution. In addition, however, to the main object of the Constitution Act, viz., the establishment and constitution of the two Houses (including the definition to a small extent of their respective powers ; the qualification of the electors and the elected ; their duration in time, etc., etc.), some other matters of great importance were enacted in pursuance of the powers (given by Clause XIV. of the Enabling Act) to make laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of the Province. These included : — (a) Power to the bi-cameral Legislature to alter the Act itself, with a proviso that : — " It shall not be lawful to present to the Governor for Her Majesty's consent any Bill by which an alteration in the Constitution of the said Legislative Council or House of Assembly may be made unless the second and third reading of such Bill shall have been passed with the concurrence of an absolute majority of the whole number of the members of the Legislative Council and of the Assembly respectively : Provided also that any Bill which shall be so presented shall be reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure thereon." (6) The subordination of the power of the Governor to his advisers by providing that : — 1. All appointments of Government officers, except the appointment of certain officers who it was enacted must be members of Parliament, viz., the Chief Secretary, the Attorney - General, the Treasurer, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Immigration, and Commissioner of Public Works, were to be made by the Governor's advisers. This was done inferentially by stating that the Governor was to make the appointments by the advice of the P^xecutive Council. 2. All control of the expenditure of the Province was to be taken from the Governor. This was also done inferentially by providing that warrants authorising expenditure were to be countersigned by the Chief Secretary. (c) The formulation of those prerogatives of the Crown which vest in the Sovereign (or his representative, the Governor) the power to call councils of Legislature together, and to dissolve same (so far as they are liable to be dissolved). (d) That Parliament should be called together once at least in every year. (e) That the judges should be independent of the Executive. (/) Inferentially that the Executive advisers of the Crown should be members of Parliament, and positively that no one else holding any office of profit or pension from the Crown, except such Executive advisers, should be members of Parliament. {£■) That the old theory, now so rudely contradicted by practice, that the revenues of the Province are the revenues of the Crown, and cannot be api)ropriated to any specific purpose except with the previous consent of the Crown, should still survive — as a theory.
