CHAP. VII.] PERSIAN SIEGE. 133 winter march to Afghanistan was unpleasant; several provincial commanders delayed joining the Emperor. Courtiers were not wanting to suggest that there was no need for hurry, as a Persian campaign in the depth of winter was most unlikely. In a weak moment Shah Jahan listened to the carpet knights of his Court; the march of the grand army was put off till the next spring. Only the Mughal Governor of Kabul threw 5,000 men and five lakhs of treasure into Qandahar to add to its defensive power.* Empire is not for the ease-loving; victory is not for the indolent. The Qandahar. Persians besiege natural consequence of neglect- ing an enemy followed. The Persian king belied his tender age and character of a drunkard. He triumphed over the depth of winter, his lack of provisions, and other difficulties on which the courtiers of Shah Jahan
Waris, 20b-21a, 23a; Khafi Khan, i. 684-686; Muhammad Afzal Husain's Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh, (Khuda Bakhsh MS.) 42a, (very brief). Rugat-i-Shah Abbas Sani, the Shah's letters to Shah Jahan before and after the siege, 52-64, his letter calling upon Daulat Khan to surrender the fort, 120-126, and some other epistles in which he exults over his victory, 105-120 (including the failures of Shah Jahan's sons). One of the letters to Shah Jahan contains the curious request, "Won't you make a free gift of Qandahar to me, who stand in the relation of a son to you?" (59) Tarikh-i-Shah-Abbas Sani by Mirza Tahir Wahid (Mulla Firuz Library) has a brief account of the Persian capture and the failure of the Mughal sieges. Digitized by Microsoft Ⓡ
