In so delicate a matter it was necessary to be cautious. The temper of the French Government was evidently uncertain. It appeared as if they were calculating on the known embarrassments of England; and a formal request for payment might be followed by repudiation, which it would be dishonourable to bear, and dangerous to resent. An opportunity must be taken when the improved relations with the Empire had assumed consistency, and Charles and Francis were on less amicable terms. The aspect of things had changed, but the change was recent. But a few months since the two Catholic princes had discussed an invasion of England, and Henry had attempted a combination to take Charles prisoner and deprive him of his Flemish provinces.
But the great powers were accustomed to varieties of attitude; and the insoluble Italian question remained still undigested. The English revolution had freed the Emperor from alarm of an Anglo-German confederacy; the retention of Milan was once more of greater importance than the friendship of Francis. He had held out hopes, it was true. He had used Milan as a bait, which Francis followed as often as it was thrown to him. Now, when he was pressed to convert his ambiguous promises into reality, he withdrew, much as he had done under similar circumstances five years before. In an interview with the Cardinal of Lorraine and with Montmorency, he said that he was so anxious to convert the truce into a peace, that he would do more than he had meant to do. He could not surrender a country
