ning in 1776, with the support and supervision of military operations. From this time forward up to the end of the century, the battle-fields are all in the west and south of India. In Bengal, the subsidiary alliance with Oudh remained the corner-stone of the British defensive system; nor was that province ever invaded, though often threatened, by the Maratha armies. But in Bombay, the President and Council being anxious to distinguish themselves by the acquisition of territory, especially of Salsette, which is close to Bombay, entered into a covenant with a Maratha chief named Raghunath Rao, who had been ejected from power at Poona, to replace him at the head of the Maratha government, stipulating for the cession of certain districts to the Company in return. The object of the Bombay President was to obtain political ascendency at Poona and to make his presidency pay its way by an increase of land revenue; but the plan was very badly laid, and the means adopted proved quite inadequate for the ends in view.
When the Calcutta government received from Bombay a copy of the treaty with Raghunath Rao, they at once totally condemned the measures that had been taken, declaring the war "impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust," and protesting that the Bombay Presidency had imposed upon itself "the charge of conquering the whole Maratha empire for a man who appeared incapable of affording effectual assistance in the undertaking." They foretold, rightly, that the enterprise would only embark them upon an indefinite
