prosecution of the war for the Union to McClellan, who, as Commander-in-Chief, was a most conspicuous failure.
The hope of the election of McClellan and the defeat of Lincoln was the inspiration that sustained Lee’s army in its desperate resistance to Grant’s terrific assaults upon its strong defenses all through the months of the political campaign. No one realized more clearly than the leaders of the Confederacy and its armies that the reëlection of President Lincoln would seal their doom. The political campaign was one of unparalleled vigor, bitterness and stern determination. Union sympathizers were firmly possessed of the belief that the only hope of preservation of the Nation as one great undivided Republic, was the strong indorsement of the war measures and general policy of the President and Congress. They did not doubt that the reëlection of Lincoln would bring an early end to the Rebellion, the destruction of slavery, and restoration of the Union.
While the Chicago platform and ticket received the support of the “Copperheads,” and all disloyal elements in the North, as well as in the five slave States, which still remained in the Union, it should not be inferred that it was not supported by thousands of Union men. There were hundreds of thousands of Democrats in these States, who were loyal to the Union, but were opposed to emancipation, and to the employment of negroes in the National army, and who believed it possible to restore the Union with slavery as it existed before the Rebellion. These men also supported McClellan. But, as the campaign progressed, it became evident that the contest was, as tersely stated by that great statesman, William H. Seward, when he said in a public address: “The issue is squarely made up—McClellan and disunion, or Lincoln and union.”
The country accepted that view, and on the 6th of September, General Fremont withdrew as a candidate of the radical Republicans for President, saying:
