THE FRENCH DRIVEN FROM NAPLES. 166 them from the pirates of Ostia ; while he succeeded, ciiapteh notwithstanding the excesses of his soldiery, in cap- 1-' tivating the giddy Neapolitans to such a degree, by his affable manners and splendid style of life, as seemed to efface from their minds every recollection of the last and most popular of their monarchs, the unfortunate Frederic. The distance of Gonsalvo's theatre of operations Position ct A the army. from his own country, apparently most discouraging, proved extremely favorable to his purposes. The troops, cut off from retreat by a wide sea and an impassable mountain barrier, had no alternative but to conquer, or to die. Their long continuance in the field without disbanding gave them all the stern, inflexible qualities of a standing army; and, as they served through so many successive campaigns under the banner of the same leader, they were drilled in a system of tactics far steadier and more uniform than could be acquired under a variety of com- manders, however able. Under these circumstan- ces, which so well fitted them for receiving impres- sions, the Spanish army was gradually moulded into the form determined by the will of its great chief. When we look at the amount of forces at the Results or the cam- disposal of Gonsalvo, it appears so paltry, especially p^'s'"- compared with the gigantic apparatus of later wars, that it may well suggest disparaging ideas of the whole contest. To judge correctly, we must direct our eyes to the result. With this insignificant force, we shall then see the kingdom of Naples conquer- ed, and the best generals and armies of France annihilated ; an important innovation effected in
