Page:History of the United States of America, Spencer, v1.djvu/559

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Ch. IV.]
THE FRENCH ALLIANCE.
527

Pursuing invariably the route marked out by reason of state, which admirably suited her convenience, France, on the one hand, amused the British ministers with protestations of friendship, and on the other, encouraged the Americans with secret succors, by the uncertainty and scantiness of them, inflaming their ardor, and confirming their resolution by continual promises of future co-operation. Unshackled in her movements, she thus pledged herself to no party, but tranquilly waited to see what course things would take.

The agents of Congress did not fail, however, to urge and besiege the cabinet of Versailles to come at length to a final decision. But the French ministers, as usual, alleged a variety of excuses in support of their system of procrastination; at one time, that the fleet expected from Newfoundland, crowded with excellent seamen, was not yet arrived; at another, that the galleons of Spain were still at sea; and at another, some new excuse was invented. Thus alternately advancing and receding, never allowing their intentions to be fathomed, they kept the Americans in continual uncertainty. Finally, the commissioners, out of all patience, and determined, if practicable, without waiting longer, to extricate themselves from the perplexing and annoying position in which they were placed, drew up, about the middle of August, a strongly worded memorial, suggesting very plainly the possibility, that America might, after all, either give up in despair, or yield to the concessions of England, and thus France be deprived of all the ardently wished for advantages she would gain by land's losing her rich and valuable colonies in America.

This memorial, however, did not produce the desired result, and England was again approached with a proposition to recognize the independence of the United States, and secure, after that, every advantage she might desire to possess. It was forcibly represented, that if the British ministry knew how to profit by the occasion, it depended on themselves to stipulate an arrangement so conducive to the prosperity of Great Britain, that she would seek in vain to procure herself similar advantages by any other means. But the British government, elated with the first successes of Burgoyne, and persuaded that victory would certainly attend his arms, refused to listen to any overtures for accommodation, and rejected the proposition with disdain. The blindness of the British ministers was incurable, and they persisted in refusing to receive America as an ally, while it was possible, choosing rather to treat her as an enemy, to be reduced to absolute, unconditional submission.

The victory of Saratoga gave a new aspect to American affairs in Europe, and equal sagacity and ability were manifested in the attention devoted to the foreign interests of the United States. The same express that carried to England the news of the surrender of Burgoyne, was the bearer of dispatches, the drift of which was to insinuate, that the Americans, disgusted by the excessive delays of the French, and indignant at not having received, in the midst of their reverses, avowed and more effica-