?94 1]'. 8 T NL E Y VO N B also correct, '(up-country) towns it is observation goes, to classify investors, European, in the same five classes. so far ?s my Indian or ' Prov?,?ciaZ Bo?ow?ng Earlier in this paper ! have already observed that the Indian structure of public loans is top heavy. This becomes clear when it is examined in the light of the classification of investors here eAop?. The rupee debt of the Government of India is & gilt-edged security and is to be classed (1)(s)? and there were outstanding on March 81st, 1917, then over 80 crores of war loan 168 crores. have been Since issued. The only other public loan stock available for inves- tors is the group of issues of the municipslibes and port trusts of the five great ports, amounting roughly to twenty crores. These are very good security, but for our purpose must be put in class the issues of Cslcuth and Bombay, class (1) (b). There are no other public authorities with .powers of taxation worth of; so that class (?) of investors are very inadequately provided for. I believe that class (?) of investors is tar more numerous in India than is gensrally supposed. Certainly public grow if of interest (?), excepting which come in issues of speaking securities available. the class would a better rate returning were At present with their limited opportunities for finding good marketable securities returning s better yield than Bovernment Promissory notes, class (?) investors turn very largely to lending on mortgage of landed and mty property. The issue of 5? per cent War Bonds, which give almost the rate of interest which they consider satisfactory, doubtless appealed widely to this class. In future, however, the Government of India is not likely to be prepared to' pay this rate of interest-- oertainly it could never pay it for permanent debt.
