CHAPTER IV.
FACTS OF CONTEMPORARY LIFE.
At vii. 15 a new section begins, consisting almost entirely
of the author's personal experiences, very loosely connected;
it continues as far as ix. 12. A curious passage at the outset
appears to describe virtue as residing in the mean between
two extremes (vii. 15-18). The appearance however is deceptive:
it is as much out of place to quote Aristotle's famous
definition of virtue ([Greek: mesotês dyo kakiôn]), as Buddha's counsel to
him who would attain perfection to 'exercise himself in the
medium course of discipline.' Koheleth merely offers practical
advice how to steer one's ship between the rocks. Do
not, he says, make your life a burden by excessive legalism.
But on the other hand, do not earn the reputation of caring
nothing for the precepts of the law. That were folly, and
would bring you to an early death.[1] Koheleth expresses this
sharply and enigmatically; do not be too 'righteous,' and do
not be too 'wicked.' 'Righteous' and 'wicked' are both to
be taken in the common acceptation of those terms in the religious
world: the words are used ironically. Our author's
only theory of virtue is that no theory is possible. The
'wisdom' which both gives 'defence' and 'preserves life'
(vii. 12) is the practical wisdom of resignation and moderation.
Of essential wisdom (or philosophy as we should call it[2]) he
says, alluding to Job xxviii. 12-23, that it is 'far off, and exceeding
deep; who can find it out?' (vii. 24.) The old theory,
- ↑ As Plumptre well remarks, the vices thought of and the end to which they lead are those of sensual license (comp. Prov. vii. 25-27).
- ↑ In Koheleth's phrase, 'that which is;' comp. Wisd. vii. 17-21, where 'the infallible knowledge of the things that are' is equivalent to a perfect natural science. Here a similar phrase means rather philosophy.
