Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/144

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MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

close combat to provide "cover invulnerable to the ordinary effects of rifle and machine gun fire, shrapnel, and shell splinters."[1] Although the British and French Armies adopted similar doctrine, continuous improvements in engines, suspension, and radios steadily increased the capabilities of such machines. In 1926 the British, responding to the prodding of Fuller, Liddell Hart, and others, tested an independent mechanized force that could make swift, deep penetrations in an enemy's rear, disorganizing and defeating an opponent before effective resistance could be mounted.[2]

The following year Secretary of War Davis observed a mechanized demonstration at Aldershot, England, and upon returning home ordered development of a similar force. On 30 December 1927, he approved an experimental brigade consisting of two light tank battalions, a medium tank platoon, an infantry battalion, an armored car troop, a field artillery battalion, an ammunition train, chemical and ordnance maintenance platoons, and a provisional motor repair section, all existing units. In July 1928 units of what was called the Experimental Mechanized Force assembled at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, under the command of Col. Oliver Estridge. For the next three months the force, more motorized than mechanized, conducted field tests. Automobile manufacturers contributed trucks and cars, but the few available pieces of mechanized equipment were obsolete.[3]

Shortly after Davis approved the organization of the Experimental Mechanized Force, Maj. Gen. Frank Parker, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3.[4] adopted another approach toward mechanization. He concluded that the mechanized experiment would lead nowhere because the force "would lack the fixity of tactical purpose and permanency of personnel on which to base experimental work, and its equipment will be so obsolete as to render its employment very dissimilar to that of a modernly-equipped mechanized force."[5] Parker recommended that Summerall appoint a board to prepare tables of organization and equipment for a mechanized force, establish the characteristics of its vehicles, and develop doctrine. Summerall, with Davis' concurrence. established the Mechanized Force Board on 15 May 1928.[6]

Within six months the board designed a combined arms armored force of approximately 2,000 officers and enlisted men. It consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company, a light tank battalion with an attached chemical company, a field artillery battalion, an engineer company, and two infantry battalions each consisting of two rifle and two machine gun companies (Chart 8). A medium tank company, an armored car troop, and a .50-caliber antiaircraft artillery detachment were to be attached to the force. Probable missions embraced spearheading an attack, serving as a counteroffensive force, penetrating enemy defenses, temporarily holding a key position, and operating in the enemy's rear area to disorganize his reserves. To carry out these missions, the officers drew up a "shopping list" for light and medium tanks, armored reconnaissance cars, semiautomatic rifles, rapid cross-country vehicles for infantry,

  1. Field Service Regulations (1923), p. 13.
  2. J. F. C. Fuller, "Tactics and Mechanization," and "Editorial Comment: Mechanization of Military Forces," Infantry Journal 30 (May 1927): 457–76, 533–35. The entire issue is devoted to mechanization.
  3. Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Experimental Mechanized Forces," Armor 78 (May–Jun 1969): 33–39; GO 16, Third Corps Area, 5 Jul 1928, 66th Armor file, DAMH-HSO: Brig Gen Daniel Van Voorhis, lecture, "Mechanization," 13 Oct 1937, at the Army War College, AWC course material 1937–1938, MHI.
  4. After World War I, the Army Staff was reorganized to consist of the Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, and Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–1, G–2, G–3, and G–4, and War Plans Division. The G–1 position corresponded to personnel, G–2 to intelligence, G–3 to operations, and G–4 to supply.
  5. Memo, G–3 for CofS, 20 Mar 28, sub: A Mechanized Force, AWC Course material, G–3/10677, 84 17, MHI.
  6. Ibid.; WD SO 110, 10 May 1928, extract printed in Rpt, Mechanized Force, 1 Oct 28, AWC course material 84—20, MHI.