 | An image should appear at this position in the text. To use the entire page scan as a placeholder, edit this page and replace "{{missing image}}" with "{{raw image|John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/180}}". Otherwise, if you are able to provide the image then please do so. For guidance, see Wikisource:Image guidelines and Help:Adding images. |  |
General Short reviews the Hawaiian Division, September 1941
he wanted a Guard division to reinforce his ground units. MacArthur instead asked for authority to reorganize the Philippine Division as a triangular unit and to fill its regimental combat teams with Regular Army personnel. Since the division's formation in 1921, most of its enlisted men were Philippine Scouts, and he wanted to use them to help organize new Philippine Army units. Marshall approved the request and initiated plans to send two infantry regiments, two field artillery battalions, a headquarters and headquarters battery for the division artillery, a reconnaissance troop, and a military police platoon to the islands. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations in the Pacific on 7 December 1941 aborted the plan.[1]
At the time of the attack the Army had thirty-six divisions, excluding the Philippine Division (Table 12), and two brigades on active duty. The nation was thus much better prepared for war in December 1941 than in April 1917.
Reorganization of the National Guard Divisions
The Japanese attack and the ensuing American declaration of war on Japan, Germany, and Italy immediately shifted the focus of Army planning from hemispheric defense to overseas operations. The first priority was to streamline the square National Guard divisions. Even before the attack Marshall had asked Twaddle to explore that possibility, believing that the surplus
- ↑ Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 31–37.
