Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/188

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166
MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

and a military police company was added. As redesigned, the motorized division fielded nearly 17,000 men. Following McNair's idea that a unit should have only those resources it habitually needed, the division, as other infantry divisions, lacked organic tank, tank destroyer, and antiaircraft artillery battalions.[1]

Before all the tables for the revised divisions were published in 1942, the War Department alerted the field commands about the pending reorganization of their units. Divisions were to adopt the new configurations as soon as equipment, housing, and other facilities became available. Most divisions adhered to the revised structures by the end of 1942.[2]

In the summer of 1942 the Army organized a fifth type of division. Between World Wars I and II it had experimented with transporting units in airplanes, and in 1940 the chief of infantry studied the possibility of transporting all elements of an infantry division by air. When the Germans successfully used parachutists and gliders in Holland and Belgium in 1940, the Army reacted by developing parachute units. The mass employment of parachutes and gliders on Crete in 1941stimulated the development of glider units. Both types of units were limited to battalion size because tacticians did not envision airborne operations involving larger units. Brig. Gen. William C. Lee, commander of the U.S. Army Airborne Command, which had been established to coordinate all airborne training, visited British airborne training facilities in England in May 1942 and following that visit recommended the organization of an airborne division.[3]

At that time the British airborne division consisted of a small parachute force capable of seizing a target, such as an airfield, and a glider force to reinforce the parachutists, leaving the remainder of the division to join those forces through more conventional means. Lee reported to McNair that the British had found the movement of ordinary troops in gliders wasteful because about 30 percent of the troops suffered from air sickness and became ineffective during air-land operations. Since the British were organizing airborne divisions, in which glider personnel were to receive the same training as parachutists, Lee suggested the U.S. Army also organize them. Heeding Lee's suggestion, McNair outlined to Marshall a 9,000-man airborne division that could have a varying number of parachute or glider units in accordance with tactical circumstances.[4]

Although the General Staff accepted the proposal, it had several reservations. The division selected for the airborne role had to have completed basic training but should not be a Regular Army or National Guard unit, as many traditionalists in those components wanted nothing to do with such an experimental force. For ease of training, it also had be stationed where air facilities and flying conditions were good. The 82d Division met the criteria. It was an Organized Reserve unit, training under Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, and located at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana. McNair recommended that it be the basis for two airborne divisions with the existing parachute infantry regiments assigned to them. For the designation of the second airborne division, the staff selected the 101st, an Organized Reserve unit that was not in active military service.[5]

  1. T/O 77, Motorized Division, 1 Aug 1942.
  2. Lit, TAG to CGs, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and other addresses, 16 Jun 42, sub: Allotments of Grades and Ratings and Authorized Strength to Tactical Units, AG 221 (6–3–42) EA-M-C, AG Reference files, and Divisional Historical Data Cards, DAMH-HSO.
  3. The Airborne Command and Center, AGF Study 25 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Section, AGF, 1946), pp. 1–12, 21; James A. Huston, Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Studies, 1962), p. 48.
  4. Memo, AGF for CofS, 2 Jul 42, sub: Policy re Training of Airborne Troops, 320.1/26 (Inf) (GNTRG) (7–2–42), AG 320.2/3 Airborne, RG 337, NARA.
  5. James M. Gavin, On to Berlin: Battle of an Airborne Commander, 1943–1946 (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 3; Memo, AGF for TAG, 29 Jul 42, sub: Airborne Division, 320.2/10 (AB Cmd) (R) GNGCT/06440 (7–29–42), AG 320.2 (7–29–42), RG 407, NARA.