Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/201

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CHAPTER 7

The Crucible—Combat

When Admiral Doenitz surrendered the German Government, every American division was in the operational theaters. All but two had seen action; one had the mission of securing the vital installations in the Hawaiian Islands; the other was an airborne division in SHAEF Reserve.

General George C. Marshall[1]

At the end of 1942, with divisions on the offensive in North Africa and the South Pacific, World War II became the crucible in which divisions tested their combat skills. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Army accelerated mobilization, but only a few divisions were parceled out to meet threats. For almost another year the War Department failed to decide on the ultimate number of divisions needed to fight the war in European and Pacific theaters. Force planners, however, continued to increase the size and number of divisions without regard for the domestic economy. Planners also paid little heed to logistical requirements, especially the means of moving units overseas. When logistical problems came to the fore, their solutions brought about changes in the structure of the divisions. Infantry, armored, and airborne divisions were reorganized; horse cavalry and motorized divisions were eliminated; and experiments with light divisions began. When victory came in Europe, the combat theaters fielded a total of eighty-nine divisions. These units had undergone considerable changes in less than three years.

Wartime Reorganization, 1943

In the late summer and early fall of 1942, while preparing Task Force "A" to participate in Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa, trained soldiers were still extremely scarce. To fill the task force, the War Department deferred reorganizing and filling the 97th Infantry Division, the last of the Organized Reserve divisions to enter active military service, and reduced three partially trained divisions to less than 50 percent of their authorized strengths. To avoid stripping divisions again and disturbing their training, the War Department designated the 76th and 78th Infantry Divisions as replacement units to receive, train, and hold men until needed. The divisions served in that capacity from October 1942 to March 1943, when replacement depots took over. Both divisions, refilled, then began their combat training program anew.[2]

  1. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War, p. 106.
  2. Memo, AGF to CofS, U.S. Army, 24 Jul 42, sub: Modification of Troop Basis, 1942, 320.2/267 (S)-GNGPS (AGF, Plans Section) (7–22–42), and 1st Ind, same subject, 8 Aug 42, AG 320.2 (7–24–42) MS-C, AG 320.2 (7–24–42), RG 407, NARA; Palmer et al., The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 175–79; Joseph J. Hutnik and Leonard Kobrick, eds., We Ripened Fast, The Unofficial History of the Seventy-Sixth Infantry Division (Frankfurt, Germany: Otto Lembeck, 1946), pp. 19–21; Lightning: The History of the 78th Infantry Division (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 9–11.