Although the divisions fell well below war levels, President Harry S. Truman responded to the United Nations resolution to stop aggression in South Korea by ordering troops to Korea on 30 June. The next day Task Force Smith, elements of the 24th Infantry Division, the closest to Korea at Kobura, Japan, deployed to Suwon, South Korea, by air. The rest of the division quickly followed by sea. Shortly after the 24th's departure, the Far East Command brought the 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division to some semblance of effective fighting strength by stripping the 7th Infantry Division. By the end of July both divisions had joined in the fight, with the almost totally gutted 7th Division remaining in Japan.[1]
As the three understrength divisions fought in Korea, the Army Staff set about to bring them to full strength, along with the 7th Infantry Division in Japan. Personnel were involuntarily extended, and the length of their overseas tours was increased. Other commands were cannibalized for units, personnel, and equipment. Particularly scarce in the Far East Command were tanks and antiaircraft artillery. Because all the divisional tank and antiaircraft artillery battalions there had been reduced to a company or battery, replacement units had to come from the United States. With the divisions in Korea taking heavy casualties and the replacement system on the verge of bankruptcy, several months elapsed before the units neared war levels.[2]
Heavy losses and the amount of time required for units and personnel to reach the Orient resulted in an agreement on 15 August between the Far East Command and the South Korean government for the temporary assignment of Korean nationals to U.S. Army units. Under the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program, approximately 8,600 Koreans were to serve in each American division as soldiers. Various barriers—language, cultural differences, inadequate training, and unfamiliarity with Army organization, weapons, and tactics—hindered the program from achieving its goal. A few months after the plan's inception, the command curtailed it because of improvements in the replacement system and the desire to concentrate on rebuilding the Republic of Korea Army. Although U.S. divisions continued to receive some Korean recruits, no division received the 8,600 initially envisaged.[3]
With United Nations troops being overwhelmed in South Korea, General Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations Forces commander, requested immediate reinforcements from the United States. In July he asked for the 2d Infantry Division, stationed at Fort Lewis; a regimental combat team from the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg; and some smaller units. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins refused to send a regimental combat team from the 82d Airborne Division, preferring to keep the division intact for other contingencies. Instead, he favored dispatching a team from the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell built around the 187th Airborne Infantry. The Joint Chiefs of Staff obtained President Truman's approval for the moves on 9 July, but many units in the United States had to be stripped to fill the 2nd Division before it could deploy.
- ↑ Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 80–88.
- ↑ Ltr, TAG to CinC, Far East, 26 Jul 50, sub; Reorganization of Certain Units in the Far East Command, AGAO-I 322 (21 Jul 50) G–1 M, AG Reference files, DAMH-HSO; Elva Stillwaugh, "Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict," ch, 1, pp. 32–40, Ms, DAMH-HSR.
- ↑ Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 385–89; Charles G. Cleaver, "History of the Korean War," vol. 3, pt. 2, Personnel Problems, pp. 7–12, Ms, DAMH-HSR; David Curtis Skaggs, "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S, Army, 1950–1965," Military Affairs 38 (Apr 1974): 53–58.
