in the armored division. Recommended changes incorporated such desirable features as the area system of communications, the administrative services company as a home for special staffs and the replacement section, an aviation company for more flexibility in the use of aircraft, and the new support command for better logistical support.[1] An image should appear at this position in the text.General Taylor
At this point Chief of Staff General Maxwell D. Taylor called a halt. On 10 April 1956, he decided the Army would not adopt the recommendations of the Atomic Field Army studies. They were not achieving more austere divisions, but, in fact, were recommending units that were larger than the post-World War II ones. He directed the Continental Army Command to terminate all initiatives concerning the Atomic Field Army but to complete reports for future reference.[2]
The Army's search for austere units that could survive on both conventional and nuclear battlefields thus appeared to have gone nowhere. Those who had tested or commented on the Atomic Field Army divisions either disagreed with or had misunderstood the overall objectives of Ridgway and the Army Staff. Maj. Gen. Garrison H. Davidson, Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, opposed a "lean" division because he thought it would sacrifice training between the combat arms and services. He also thought that such a division was inappropriate for use as a mobilization base. The college, he noted, preferred "a very flexible outfit, which could be beefed up or skinned down as necessary on deployment."[3]
Furthermore, those who evaluated the divisions paid little heed to use of tactical atomic weapons. Over 250 simulated tests had been conducted in the Sagebrush exercise. Taylor concluded after the exercises that "we in the Army have a long way to go before we understand the problems of using these weapons," noting that "we would have probably destroyed ourselves and all our friends had we tossed atomic weapons about a real battlefield in the way we did in this maneuver."[4]
Pentomic Divisions
In response to Ridgway's directive in November 1954, the Army War College had begun work on a study entitled "Doctrinal and Organizational Concepts for Atomic-Nonatomic Army During the Period 1960–1970," which had the short title
- ↑ Ltr, CONARC to TAG and other addresses, 23 May 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Armored Division, and Ltr, CONARC to TAG and other addresses, 25 Apr 56, sub: Concept and Technical Review of the Tentative 1956 ATFA Infantry Division.
- ↑ Ltr, TAG to CG, CONARC, 6 Jun 56, sub: The 1956 Army Reorganization, AGAM-P (Office of the Adjutant General, Publications Branch) 320 (5 Jun 56) DCSOPS, Division General file, DAMH-HSO.
- ↑ Ltr, Garrison H, Davidson to Willard G, Wyman, 21 Feb 56, CGSC Library.
- ↑ Moenk, Large-Scale Army Maneuvers, p. 212; Transcript of Address by General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Before the Army School Commandants, Room 2E-715A, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Thursday, 28 Feb 57, CS 322 (1 Feb 57), RG 319, NARA.
