Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/330

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308
MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER

weapons systems was over 200 percent. But the new divisions were going to be costly and the full implementation of ROAD would have to await the arrival of new equipment. Until then fixed-wing aircraft would have to be used in place of helicopters, and infantry battalions would substitute for mechanized infantry battalions until armored personnel carriers were available. Furthermore, because of insufficient personnel, the divisions would be maintained at less than ideal strength.[1]

The ROAD Reorganization

The Army Staff began planning for the ROAD reorganization during the summer of 1962. It set the combination of maneuver elements as follows: for the armored division, six tank and five mechanized infantry battalions; for the mechanized infantry division, three tank and seven mechanized infantry battalions; for the infantry division, two tank and eight infantry battalions; and for the airborne division, one assault gun (tank) and eight airborne infantry battalions. The planners anticipated difficulty in finding the men to fill the units because the authorized strength of the Regular Army was only 960,000. Decker recommended that Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance seek Department of Defense approval for an increase in Army strength as well as the retention of 3,000 KATUSA personnel in both the 1st Cavalry and 7th Infantry Divisions stationed in Korea. If no increase could be obtained, then Decker recommended that divisions in the United States and Korea have fewer maneuver battalions than outlined in the plan.[2]

Reorganization of the remaining divisions took place between January 1963 and May 1964 (Table 24), But, as feared, the Department of Defense decided not to seek an increase in the size of the Army, and the reorganization left the Army's divisions at reduced strength except for the units in Europe. Infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored divisions ranged between 14,000 and 16,000 men each, except for the 1st Cavalry and 7th Infantry Divisions, which were authorized about 12,000 men each plus their KATUSA personnel. In the airborne divisions, nine airborne infantry battalions and a tank battalion replaced the eight airborne infantry battalions and assault gun (tank) battalion, but the airborne tank battalion was allotted only experimental equipment, The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions fielded about 13,500 men each. In Germany the airborne capability was moved from the 24th Infantry Division at Augsburg to the 8th Infantry Division at Bad Kreuznach, with one brigade containing all the airborne assets.[3]

As the Regular Army completed the ROAD reorganization, the Army made further revisions in the division organizations. Headquarters and service batteries in all artillery battalions except for the Honest John unit were combined to save personnel. More important, the Davy Crocketts were restricted to infantry battalions, and the weapons were fo be issued only in response to specific instructions. The Army had debated the appropriate level at which to control nuclear weapons since their introduction, Like its predecessors, the Kennedy administration continued to stress political control of such weapons.[4]

  1. Ibid.
  2. Ibid.; Fact Sheet on Reorganization of Army Division (ROAD), 10 Jan 63. Division General file, DAMH-HSO.
  3. Ltr, TAG to CG, Fourth U.S. Army. and other addresses, 3] May 63, sub; Reorganization of the 2d Armored Division Under ROAD, AGAO-O (M) (10 May 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinC, USAREUR, 21 Jun 63, sub: Reorganization of 3d Armored Division Under ROAD TOE, AGAO-O (M) (22 May 63) DCSPER, Ltr. TAG to CinC, USAREUR, 19 Jun 63, sub; Reorganization of the 4th Armored Division Under ROAD TOE, AGAO-O (M) (22 May 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARPAC, and CG, CONARC, 15 Jul 63, sub: Reorganization of the 1st Cavalry Division, AGAO-O (M) (14 Jun 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CG, Fifth U.S. Army, 23 Oct 63, sub: Reorganization of the 1st Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) (30 Sep 63), DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinC, USAREUR, and other addresses, 25 Jan 63, sub: Change in Status of Units, AGAO-O (M) (22 Jan 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CINCs, USAREUR and USARPAC, 23 May 63, sub: Reorganization of 3d Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) (18 Apr 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CGs, CONARC and Sixth U.S. Army, 21 Aug 6 sub: Reorganization of the 4th Infantry Division Under ROAD, AGAO-O (M) (29 Jul 63) DCSPER, TAG to CinC, USARPAC, and CG, CONARC, 7 Jun 63, sub: Reorganization of the 7th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) (31 May 63) DCSPER, Ltr, OTAG to TAG, 20 Sep 63, sub: Change in Status of Units, 20 Sep 63, AGAO-O (M) (13 Sep 63), Ltr, TAG to CinC, USAREUR, 8 May 63, sub: Reorganization of the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), AGAO-O (10 Apr 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CinC, USARPAC, and CG, CONARC, 17 Jul 63, sub: Reorganization of the 25th Infantry Division, AGAO-O (M) (24 Jun 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CG, Third U.S. Amy, 21 Jan 64, sub Reorganization of STRAF Units, No, 18, FY 64, AGAO-O (M) (31 Dee 63) DCSPER, Ltr, TAG to CG, Third U.S. Army, 6 Mar 64, sub: Reorganization of STRAF Units, No. 58, FY 64, AGAO-O (19 Feb 64) DCSPER, all AG Reference files, Historical Data Cards, Divisions, DAMH-HSO; "8th Infantry Division," Soldiers 39 (Jan 1985): 13–14.
  4. TOE 7E, Infantry Division, 1963; TOE 17E, Armored Division, 1963, TOE 37E, Mechanized Infantry Division, 1963, and TOE 57E, Airborne Division, 1963, and subordinate TOEs for each division; Midgley, Deadly Illusions, p. 116.