ety of forces to bear on the foe as quickly as possible and to sustain them until final victory. A test of the new division was scheduled for 1997.
Six years after the war in Southwest Asia, many questions regarding the Army's future force structure remain. The failure to implement the round-out concept during that conflict is only the first of many. How well did the Army's divisions and separate brigades perform in Southwest Asia against a confused and greatly weakened adversary? Has the Army cut too many divisions from the force too quickly; will it attain the right balance of divisions in the active and reserve forces; and how radically can the heavy and light divisions be redesigned to meet contingencies of the future within budgetary constraints that appear ever changing? How seriously has the elimination of the separate combined arms brigades hindered flexibility in designing the active force? A more basic question was also left unanswered. Is the division the best vehicle to organize the combat arms for the future or should it be the brigade, as some have argued? If history has shown us anything, it is that the future is always unpredictable and that the basic ingredient of success will continue to be a mind-set that allows the greatest speed and flexibility in adopting new technologies, new missions, and new constraints to the Army's ever-changing organizations for combat.
