- provisions for periodic evaluation of MSAW equipment should be established to ensure system integrity and reliability; and
- configuration management of all software should be reflected in appropriate documents and centrally controlled.
In addition, in an October 1997 briefing to Safety Board investigators, FAA officials presented the agency's planned corrective actions for the national MSAW system. The officials stated that the FAA was developing a central oversight process for the MSAW program and that MSAW systems would be flight checked and ground certified as part of the commissioning process for a new radar and then periodically thereafter. Further, the officials said that the FAA had approved a new MSAW software management policy that "established strict management oversight and control" for MSAW software modifications.
1.18.1.2 Previous Safety Board Recommendations on the Minimum Safe Altitude Warning System
The Safety Board has issued numerous safety recommendations regarding the MSAW system. Recent MSAW safety recommendations have addressed the installation of MSAW equipment in VFR terminal facilities that receive radar information from a host radar control facility (as is the case with the Agana tower), as well as the inspection and testing of MSAW speakers to ensure the integrity of MSAW systems.
Development of an MSAW System (A-73-46)
On December 29, 1972, Eastern Air Lines flight 401, a Lockheed L-1011, N310EA, crashed near Miami, Florida. In its final report,[1] the Safety Board stated that its investigation ...revealed another instance where the ARTS III system conceivably could have aided the approach controller in his ability to detect an altitude deviation of a transponder-equipped aircraft, analyze the situation, and take timely action...to assist the flight crew. In this instance, the controller, after noticing on his radar that the alphanumeric block representing flight 401 indicated an altitude of 900 feet, immediately queried the flight as to its progress. An immediate positive response from the flight crew, and the knowledge that the ARTS III equipment, at times, indicates incorrect information for up to three scans, led the controller to believe that flight 401 was in no immediate danger.
As a result of its findings, the Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation A-73-46, which asked the FAA to
- ↑ 123 National Transportation Safety Board. 1973. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. L-1011, N310EA, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-73/14. Washington, DC.
