imply their subsequent fusion to the complete obliteration of British influence. This, of course, should be impossible; and it would be, if the British Government would awaken to the importance of maintaining unimpaired its prestige in Korea. We have little material interest in Korea, but it must not be forgotten that our position in the kingdom should be superior to that of France, and equal to that of Russia. If it were not that France is the partisan and ally of Russia in Korea, as well as elsewhere, there would be no occasion to do aught but support benevolently the policy of Japan, without unnecessarily endorsing the aggressiveness which distinguishes the attitude of the Island Empire to its neighbour. But if we wish to preserve our position we must put a little more vigour into our policy, and, while maintaining our working agreement with Japan, proceed to guarantee the integrity of our own interests. These would be best served by insisting upon the retention of a British nominee in the supervision of the Korean Maritime Customs. Our action in this respect would meet with the unqualified approval of Japan and the United States of America, whose trading interests, equally with our own, justify predominance in this control.
The financial embarrassment of the Korean Government, at the present time, is the outcome of the abnormal extravagance of the Court. Anything which would tend to increase the load of debt with which the Emperor encumbers the dwindling resources of the national wealth, is neither politic nor desirable. The sources of the Imperial revenue resemble in lesser degree those which prevail in China. There are the Land Tax, paid no longer in grain, which returned four and a half of the seven million yen odd, composing the total domestic revenue in 1901; a House Tax, assessed capriciously
