particularly in their fortified positions, to which places the Russian transported the seizures which they made from the Chinese during the Boxer crisis. These embraced French, German and British examples of artillery.
On land, the immense superiority of the reserve numbers of the Russians reduces the advantages which would accrue to the Japanese if the fighting were confined to the sea. At the same time, however, it should be remembered that the Russian troops are slow movers, and although they may exhibit magnificent endurance, and although they may be relied upon to fight well, the lack of individual initiative upon the part of the Russian officers robs the operations of that dash and address which is embodied in the spirit of the Japanese army. Curiously enough, each side favours the Continental school of infantry and cavalry tactics, the underlying principles in the training of the Japanese revealing a close adherence to Teutonic methods. Neither side will profit, therefore, by any degree of indivisibility to which they may have attained. The winter great-coat of either army is very nearly identical in colour, and for warm weather Japanese and Russians alike favour a white blouse. There has been talk of the Japanese adopting a khaki tint; upon the other hand, the blouse of the Russian soldier is by courtesy equally white or khaki. In the more important direction of land transport, it might appear that the Manchurian railway would be a crowning triumph for the Russian authorities. Unfortunately, this immense length of rail, badly laid and indifferently equipped, will impose a perpetual strain upon the military resources. If the country population could be relied upon to maintain a benevolent neutrality towards telegraph poles and lines, railway sleepers and rails, the stone pillars
