Page:Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion volume 2.djvu/149

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of as coming into contact with each other, and getting into conflict with themselves. This conflict is, however, the appearance of the contradiction itself in an immediate way, for the different gods have to maintain themselves in accordance with their own nature or quality, and it is here that their finitude comes to light. In so far as God is presupposed as being the Universal or the Essence, that finitude which is involved in the multiplicity is inadequate to express what is contained in that presupposition.

In the case of finite things we are accustomed to think that substances may be in conflict without losing their independence. It would seem, then, that it is only their superficial elements which they send out to engage in the conflict, while they keep their real selves in the background. In accordance with this a distinction is made between the inner nature of the subject and its relations, between the substance considered in reference to others and the substance as passive, without prejudice to its aforesaid activity. This distinction is as yet unproved. What the many are so far as content and power are concerned, they are only in contrast with something else; their Being, as reflected into self, is simply something devoid of content. If they are thus, so far as form also is concerned, independent, they are, nevertheless, finite so far as the content is concerned, and this succumbs to the same process of dialectic as that to which finite Being has to yield. In face of the presupposition of absolute Power, of the universal negativity of all that has Being, the multiplicity of such formal finite things accordingly directly disappears. It is directly involved in the presupposition of the Universal, that form and content cannot be so separated that a quality can attach to the one which is wanting to the other. Thus the gods by means of their qualities directly cancel each other.

Multiplicity is, however, in this case taken also in the sense of pure difference which does not come in contact with itself. Thus we speak of a multiplicity of worlds