Page:Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited (Trial Judgment).pdf/41

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129 What is notable about this civil case, and the criminal case that preceded it, is that by reason of Mr Lehrmann's forensic position to contest the establishment of the first element (that sexual intercourse occurred), he has not engaged directly (through challenging the Crown case at the criminal trial or by way of evidence before me) with the reality and appreciation of consent.

130 Specifically, Mr Lehrmann has advanced an account that he came back to the Ministerial Suite accompanied by Ms Higgins for them to then go their separate ways: not only was there no sex, but no intimacy of any kind.

131 Below I explain why this aspect of Mr Lehrmann's evidence is stuff and nonsense, but for present purposes, this conclusion makes it necessary to point out that in general, disbelief of one witness's account does not establish the contrary, or that a witness giving a contrary account must be believed: Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34; (2004) 220 CLR 363 (at 385–386 [60] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ).

132 Of course, if I am ultimately unable to make a finding one way or another as to what actually happened, it is open to decide the issue on the basis that the party who bears the burden of proof on this issue (that is, the respondents) have failed to discharge their burden: Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948 (at 955–956 per Lord Brandon, Lords Fraser, Diplock, Roskill and Templeman agreeing). Relatedly, and importantly, given my rejection of Mr Lehrmann's account of what went on, it must be borne in mind that a civil onus of proof is not discharged by mere disbelief in opposing evidence (see, for example, in the context of a criminal onus, Liberato v R (1985) 159 CLR 507 (at 515 per Brennan J)).

E.7Multiple Available Hypotheses and Onus

133 Related to the last point, it is also necessary to consider the existence and cogency of other hypotheses open on the evidence.

134 Recently, in Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCA 1391, Perram J, in an unusual circumstantial case (and with apologies to those, like me, who thought that algebra would not be involved in this case) observed (at [21]):

Where there are only two competing hypotheses that between them account for the universe of possibilities open on the evidence, a court's satisfaction that one is more likely than the other will entail that the occurrence of the fact supported by the more likely hypothesis is proved on the civil standard. Whilst it is important not to approach the civil standard in an excessively arithmetical way in terms of numeric

Lehrmann v Network Ten Pty Limited (Trial Judgment) [2024] FCA 369
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