have been imprudent to themselves, as well as wicked to the public;—that their example is not within the reach of emulation;—and that, in the first session after the next election, some popular measures may probably be adopted. He does not expect that a dissolution of parliament will destroy corruption, but that, at least, it will be a check and terror to their successors, who will have seen, that, in flagrant cases, their constituents can and will interpose with effect.—After all, sir, will you not endeavour to remove or alleviate the most dangerous symptoms, because you cannot eradicate the disease? Will you not punish treason or parricide, because the sight of a gibbet does not prevent high-way robberies? When the main argument of Junius is admitted to be unanswerable, I think it would become the minor critic, who hunts for blemishes, to be little more distrustful of his own sagacity.—The other objection is hardly worth an answer. When Junius observes, that kings are ready enough to follow such advice, he does not mean to insinuate, that, if the advice of parliament were good, the king would be so ready to follow it.
