than in his 'Subjection of Women.' Mill theoretically grounds all knowledge on experience, but throughout this treatise he minimizes the importance of natural and undisputed facts; he in effect inculcates the neglect of the lessons to be derived from historical experience embodied in the general, if not universal, customs of mankind; he bids his disciples prefer to such teaching conclusions drawn logically enough from some general dogmas which are far from possessing absolute truth. Thus, in favour of some a priori assumption as to the essential equality or similarity of human beings, we are counselled to overlook what has curiously been called the 'accident of sex.'
Thirdly, I at last, though slowly, reached the firm conviction that the right to a Parliamentary vote ought not to be considered the private right of the individual who possesses it. It is in reality not a right at all; it is rather a power or function given to a citizen for the benefit not primarily of himself, but of the public. This is assuredly the doctrine of English law, no less than of common sense. It affords the sole, but also the ample, justifica-
