human hands. According to the well-known expression, its situation in the human body corresponds to that of a pilot on a vessel, or to that of a sculptor or his assistant before the marble or clay. And, in fact, we have no other clear image of a cause external to the object. We have no other representation of a force external to matter than that which is offered by the craftsman making an object, or in general by the human being with his activity, free, or supposed to be free, and directed towards an end to be realized.
Personifications of this kind, the mythological entities, the imaginary beings, the ontological fictions, which ever filled the stage in the mind of our predecessors, have definitely disappeared; no longer have they a place in the scientific explanations of our time. The neo-vitalists replace them by the idea of direction, which is another form of the same idea of finality. The series of second causes in the living being seems to be regulated in conformity with a plan, and directed with a view to carrying it out. The tendency which exists in every being to carry out this plan,—that is to say, the tendency towards its end,—gives the impulse that is necessary to carry it out. Neo-vitalists claim that vital force directs the phenomena which it does not produce, and which are in reality carried out by the general forces of physics and chemistry.
Thus, the directing impulse, considered as really active, is the last concession of modern vitalism. If we go further, and if we refuse to the directing idea executive power and efficient activity, the vital principle is weakened, and we abandon the doctrine. We can no longer invoke it. We cease to be vitalists if the part played by the vital principle is thus far restricted. At first it was both the author of the
