Page:Margaret Hamilton of Rockhall v Lord Lyon King of Arms.pdf/39

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39

and for Dr Lindberg in the past, does not constitute the giving of notice to the other contracting parties of an intention to terminate the Agreement.
2. Secondly, in any event, no reasonable period of notice was given. Having regard to the timescales involved in the brokerage of barony titles, one year would have been a reasonable period of notice within which to conclude all ongoing business. Such a period of notice was not given by the defender. In any event, the defender fails to relevantly aver what a reasonable period of notice would have been in these particular circumstances; and fails to aver any factual circumstances from which such a period could be inferred.

For these two reasons, no valid notice of termination of the Agreement was ever given by the defender to the other contracting parties and therefore the Agreement remains in full force and effect.

[69] The defender's averments in Answer 6, relating to terminating the Agreement upon the giving of notice, being irrelevant and lacking in specification, these averments ought not to be admitted to probation.


No material change of circumstances

[70] The pursuer accepts that the Agreement cannot continue indefinitely and will come to an end upon a material change in circumstances. However, the Agreement remains in full force and effect as there has been no material change in circumstances since the date on which it was entered into. None of the pursuer's averments give rise to any such inference. In any event, the defender has not relevantly averred any such material change in circumstances. He developed this as follows.