cause.[1] For she may now be executed before the child is quick in the womb; and shall not, by her own incontinence, evade the sentence of justice." 4 Bl. Com. 395; (see also 2 Hawk. P. C. 658, and authorities there.) But Sir M. Hale says that though she be quick a second time she shall have no respite on that account. 1 P. C. 369. And yet he afterwards draws a nice distinction in favorem prolis, that if the woman were not quick, or with child at all,[2] at the time of the first inquest of the matrons, and afterwards become with child, she shall have her respite; "for the advantage she had at first was not really by reason of pregnancy, but by a mistake of the jury of women." "And therefore as hath been said, in all cases of reprieves for pregnancy, the judge ought to make a new demand, what the prisoner hath to say wherefore execution should not be awarded." Ib. And so in all cases where any time intervenes between the attainder and the award of execution, for the party may have become insane, or may plead pregnancy, or a pardon, or an act of grace, or diversity of person, that he is not the same that was attainted. 1 Bl. Com. 396.
This brings us to the last of the pleas which we have proposed to treat upon under this head. The question of Personal Identity may arise in many ways; as whether a child claiming an inheritance is the same that he pretends, or is pretended to be, as in the Douglas or Anglesea causes; (vide ante) whether a prisoner is actually the person who committed a particular offence, when the jury tries the fact and the identity to-
