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tiate. In the course of the argument it was said that only those were to be admitted who were "profound sad and discrete, groundedly learned and deeply studied in physic:.' but if so, it destroys the argument arising from the words "omnes homines ejusdem facultatis." An argument has also been drawn from the statute 3 Hen. 8:, and it has been said that the persons licensed by that act were the only persons who at the time of the charter were men of the faculty, and that they and the six persons named were meant to be incorporated. But the words of the charter do not extend to all those persons; they are confined to the "homines de et in civitate prædictâ," that is, to all men of and in the city of London practising physic: but this does not extend to persons practising in other places. Now if that construction had been adopted, it would have excluded the greater part of those who have been members of the college practising physic in Oxford, Cambridge, and other places beyond these limits, as not falling within the description of those persons of whom (according to the construction) the college is to consist.

Taking the whole of the charter and the usage this construction will reconcile all the difficulties; the intention of the Crown was to incorporate the six persons named in the charter and all men practising physic at that time de et in civitate prædictâ; and all those persons were entitled to admission: but the Crown did not intend to give any right to those, who might thereafter become homines facultatis, but intended that the succession should be continued by the power incident to all corporations to elect. Had the charter of incorporation nominated every man authorised to practise physic in London and given no directions as to the succession, they would have been authorised to continue themselves by election as they have done; and the charter has done the same thing in substance by incorporating the same persons by a general reference to their character and situation. This avoids all contradiction; it is consistent with the usage; and according to this construction no one is entitled