an attribute is naturally found, e.g. colour in a surface. 'That in virtue of which,' then, in the primary sense is the form, and in a secondary sense the matter of each thing and the proximate substratum of each. — In general 'that in virtue of which' will be found in the same number of senses as 'cause'; for we say 'in virtue of what has he come?' or 'for what end has he come?'; and 'in virtue of what has he inferred wrongly, or inferred at all?' or 'what is the cause of the inference, or of the wrong inference?' — Further (3) καθό[1] is used in reference to position, e.g. 'in which he stands' or 'in which he walks'; for all such phrases indicate place and position.
Therefore 'in virtue of itself' must have several meanings. It applies to (1) the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and the essence of Callias; (2) whatever is present in the 'what', e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal. For 'animal' is present in the formula that defines him; Callias is a particular animal. — (3) Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of its parts, e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, in which life directly resides, is a part of the man. — (4) That which has no cause other than itself; man has more than one cause - animal, two-footed — but man is man in virtue of himself. — (5) Whatever attributes belong to a thing alone and qua alone; hence also that which exists separately is 'in virtue of itself'.
Chapter 19
'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or of potency or of kind; for there must be a certain position, as the word 'disposition' shows.
Chapter 20
'Having'[2] means (1) a kind of activity of the haver and the had — something like an action or movement. When one thing makes and one is made, between them there is a making; so
