facts an abstract metaphysic is in an extremely awkward position. If it scorns to excuse its failure by pious phrases concerning the infinite capacity of a non-human mind to solve the insoluble, if it dreads to have recourse to the more impious ἀργός λόγος of Mr Bradley, and to postulate an Absolute which ‘absorbs,’ ‘transmutes,’ ‘submerges,’ ‘suppresses’ and ‘reconciles’ all difficulties ex officio, in a manner no doubt highly satisfactory to itself and Mr Bradley, two alternatives remain. Either the idea that a contradiction is a necessary proof of falsehood must be given up, and one or both sides of the antinomy must be accepted in spite of everything — in which case it is hard to say what weapon would be left to refute the most patent absurdities ; or one must hope for such an enlargement of the human reason as will give it an insight into what is at present incomprehensible. For the difficulties in question have been under scrutiny too long to render it credible that any thinkable solution has been overlooked. If, however, a development of the human mind be admitted, the reality of the Time-process, in which that development takes place, can no longer be denied, and abstract metaphysic becomes indebted to it for the means to solve its difficulties. Is it not curious, then, to go on maintaining that the Time-process is unfit to form a factor in an ultimate philosophy?
An evolutionist philosophy on the other hand would not only be entitled, but bound, to await a solution of its difficulties from the secular development of the Time-process which had generated them. For its ultimate appeal is not to the abstract reason but to experience, to the Time-process in which that reason develops. It is consequently an ignoratio elenchi to infer that a view leadfng to an antinomy is false, unless it can be shown that the antinomy is a permanent one. But not only is that impossible, but a solution ambulando may be expected on two grounds. (1) Reality, the data of our reasonings, may so change as no longer to suggest the antinomy. For instance, the problem of imperfection would vanish, if reality attained to perfection and not even a memory remained of the imperfect. And (2) the antinomy might be resolved by such a development of the mind as would enable it to see through its present difficulties. As for instance, if we could view the world from the standpoint of Mr Bradley’s Absolute. I am aware that many of our present philosophers have a rooted objection to putting their hope in the future; yet it is only in the direction of an abandonment of the prejudice against the reality of Time, that I can descry a future for hope, a future for philosophy and a philosophy for the future.
