TYPES OF WILL. 303 while the second ask what will be given, done, or happen to the self. And their answers correspond. The first three affirm that the self is to be an agent in taking, doing or be- coming something : the second that the self is to be a patient, as the recipient of a gift, as suffering some action, as undergoing some transformation of character. Complex volition or choice is then a judgment of the self's agency. It is the outcome of such a doubt and question as must, if it be answered, result in choice. And it emerges when that antecedent process " has worked itself out to a definite con- clusion "- 1 But the three examples we have taken represent different types : (1) The mind of the traveller is made up at the out- set. He confines himself to the one question, " Which route is shortest? " He is determined to take the shortest. Now this set of his will may have been the outcome on a former occasion of doubt, question and conflict, in which case it is choice, according to our provisional definition. On the other hand, it may not have been. The man may never have asked, " Shall I take the shorter route or the more beautiful ? " But his strong practical habits and commercial interests may have determined his will without doubt or conflict, in the only way that would seem reasonable to him. He knows he is going to take the shorter route, and he has never thought of taking any other. His initial determi- nation is not choice, it is a simple not a complex voli- tion. But its subsequent progress is marked by doubt, question and conflict. The man now asks, "Which route is shorter?" He is uncertain which. Still this conflict is merely a conflict of ideas. The question is addressed only to the intellect. It does not unsettle the will. It does not mean, " What am I going to will ? " for that is already deter- mined, but, "What am I going to know?" viz., whether this or the other route will accomplish my preformed volition. Where then is there a real choice ? A simple volition con- trols the subsequent sequence and works out the means to its own accomplishment. Doubt, question and conflict fol- low, instead of as in real choice preceding, volition. The complexity is a complexity of thought merely, and as far as the will is concerned its choice is fictitious. Still we may argue, The traveller has reached the conclu- sion that he is going to take this and not the alternative route. His judgment is will according to our definition; and it follows a process of doubt and conflict and is, therefore, 1 MIND, N.S., vol. v., p. 131.
