PERCEPTION OF CHANGE AND DURATION. 5 cessive process cannot be detected by introspection, why not simply say that they are not in consciousness at all ? Prof. Meinong replies that they are there because they must be there. His argument is in brief as follows : In order to apprehend a relation, or the form of combination character- istic of a complex whole, we must simultaneously apprehend the terms related, or the constituent parts of the whole. This seems obvious primd facie. And we may admit the truth of the contention if it only means that we must have some sort of apprehension of the terms related in order to apprehend a relation. But the real question is whether all the related terms must appear in the form of sensorial images, either of perception or of memory ? And this question must be answered in the negative. There are two kinds of apprehension the determinate and the in- determinate. Tlie whole process of consciousness, so far as it has continuity of interest, consists in passing, or endeavouring to pass, from indeterminate to determinate apprehension. Whenever we are aware of an object of any kind, what is definitely presented at any moment is only part of the whole which we perceive or think of. When I catch sight of an orange, all that is present to consciousness, in the way of sensation or sensorial imagery, may be only the yellow colour and a characteristic shape and texture. But the colour, shape, and texture, have for me a certain significance. They mean an orange. The various detailed experiences which I have had in the past in connexion with oranges profoundly modify my present consciousness, though they do not reappear in it as distinct experiences as memory images. Collectively they give rise to a modification of conscious content, which functions for certain purposes instead of the detailed experience. They make possible the indeterminate apprehension of the orange as a certain specific kind of whole, without dis- crimination of more than a few of its characteristic con- stituents. If I pick the orange up and eat it, I progressively transform my indeterminate awareness of it into deter- minate awareness. I recognise that I am apprehending the details of the same object which I had previously ap- prehended indistinctly. My implicit apprehension becomes explicit. It is easy to apply these statements to the special case in which we apprehend a succession as such. At the end of a melody the last note alone may be in conscious- ness, and yet we may cognise the melody as a whole. The_ .preceding notes in disappearing have left traces behind them in the way of psychical or physiological dispositions or
